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1. Introduction 
Early scholars of aggregate fluctuations, including Jevons ( 1884) and Kemmerer ( 1910), 
introduced the notion that seasonal cycles were relevant to the study of other, seemingly more important, 
fluctuations in macroeconomic time series. Kuznets (1933) continued this approach, recognizing the 
tendency for seasonal variations to exacerbate the variability of employment and capital accumulation. 
But, as economic contractions intensified in the J 930's, economists began to discount the relative 
importance of the seasonal cycle. Work by Mitchell (1927), Pigou (I 929) and later, Burns and Mitchell 
( 194 7), promulgated the view that fluctuations in commercial activity were relevant to the study of 
business cycles, while seasonal fluctuations were not. 
Currently, economists are calling for the reinterpretation of seasonal fluctuations as a means to 
understanding business cycles.2 As Miron ( 1996) explains, seasonal fluctuations account for a large 
portion of the overall movement in macroeconomic time series, and may be related to the behavior of 
non-seasonal (business) cycles. Moreover, to the extent that seasonal cycles are not Pareto Optimal, 
understanding how monetary and fiscal policy decisions can eliminate them may prove useful. 
While promising, the efficacy of such an approach is limited ultimately by economists' 
understanding of the seasonal cycle. Hence, in order to add to our knowledge of business cycles, the 
complexities of US seasonal cycles must be unraveled. One such example, for which numerous studies 
have been written, is the cessation of seasonal pressures on US money markets in 1914.3 While the 
disappearance of seasonal variations in US interest rates is compelling simply because it challenges our 
intuition that seasonal cycles are endemic fixtures of US money markets, the implications of this episode 
are all the more pressing in light of the recent literature linking seasonal and business cycles. 
In this paper we examine the origins of the seasonal cycle in US interest rates, beginning in the 
antebellum period, in order to gain a better understanding of when and why seasonal pressures emerged 
(and perhaps, disappeared) in early US financial markets. Seasonal tests indicate that variations in short-
2 See Beaulieu and Miron (1997), Beaulieu, et al. ( 1992), Miron and Beaulieu (1996), and Wells ( 1997). 
'See Angelini (1992), Barsky, et al. (1988), Clark (1986), Fishe (1991 ), Fishe and Wohar (1990), Friedman and 
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term interest rates are relatively unexplained by the seasonal cycle prior to the mid-1870s, and hence, are 
similar to their post-1914 counterparts. 
We propose that the absence of a seasonal cycle prior to the l 870's was most likely due to money 
market volatility. Prior to 1874, movements in interest rates were erratic and financial instabilities 
imparted relatively large shocks to money markets, particularly in the autumn months. After 1874, the 
effects of financial instabilities on interest rates diminished and the regularization of seasonal movements 
was attained. We attribute this change in behavior of short-term rates in the nineteenth century to the 
following institutional innovation: the introduction of futures markets and the resulting substitution away 
from consignment contracts in the agricultural trade shortly after 1874. 
The US experience with interest rate seasonals questions the view that seasonal cycles are a well-
defined and predictable phenomenon in macroeconomic time series. Like business cycles, seasonal 
cycles can exhibit irregularities, as exemplified by their absence prior to 1874, as well as after 1914, and 
hence should not be dismissed as uninteresting fluctuations. Moreover, that a financial innovation 
contributed to the regularization of seasonal cycles in 1874 is particularly compelling, given the recent 
connection drawn between seasonal and business cycles, insofar as it suggests that business cycles may 
also be regularized by economic innovations. 
2. Seasonality in US Short-term Interest Rates 
Since the inception of US money markets in the late eighteenth century, annual seasonal 
fluctuations have occurred in the demand and supply for credit, causing interest rates to drop in the late 
spring and summer and rise in the fall and early winter of most years. 4 According to Kemmerer ( 1910), 
in a monograph prepared for the National Monetary Commission, this periodic tightening of credit was 
fueled by interregional cash transfers that financed the planting, harvesting and moving of the nation's 
crops.5 Friedman and Schwartz ( 1963) explain that these cash transfers lead to fluctuations in the public's 
currency to deposit ratio, causing bank reserves and credit conditions to expand and contract throughout 
Schwartz, (1963). Holland and Toma (1991), Kool (1995), Mankiw and Miron (1986), Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987), Miron (1986), Miron 
(1988). and Toma (1993) 
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the year. 6 This explanation is supported by Mankiw, et. al. ( l 987), who show that seasonal variations in 
US short-term interest rates were common throughout the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7 
However, seasonal pressures in US money markets disappeared abruptly in 1914.8 Table I 
illustrates this change in behavior for the New York commercial paper rate between 1875 and 1936. 
While the mean level of the series remains relatively unchanged over the period, the adjusted R2's from 
regressions of the paper rate on monthly (seasonal) dummies shows that the seasonal cycle explains 19% 
of the variation in the (differenced) paper rate before 1914, compared to 2% afterwards. 9 Indeed, Miron 
(1986) identifies a similar cessation of seasonal fluctuations using the New York 3-month time money 
rate. 10 
Table 1: Summary statistics, monthly data in first differences. 
Sample Standard Sample Period Mean Deviation 
New York (a), 1875:01-1910:12 4.88 1.12 
New York (b), 1920:01 1936:12 3.71 1.97 
L • Adjusted R 1s based on the following regress10n specification. 
Llx, = c + o2(d2) + o3(d3) + ... + 812(dl2) + i::1 
Adj. 
R-Squared 
0.19 
0.02 
Most of the literature surrounding this conundrum is centered on the establishment of the Federal 
Reserve System.11 In particular, Friedman and Schwartz ( 1963) remark that the Fed eliminated seasonal 
movements in US interest rates through its manipulation of high powered money; Holland and Toma 
( 1991) contend that the Fed provided emergency credit to banks during (seasonal) panics, thus quelling 
(seasonal) spikes in interest rates; Barsky, et. al. (l 988) offer an international perspective by proposing 
that the establishment of the Fed allowed the US (and other countries) to smooth interest rates without 
4 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987), and Miron ( l986). 
'Kemmerer, E.W., Seasonal Variations in the Relative Demand For Money and Capital in the United States, p. 292. 
6 Friedman, M. and A. J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States. 1867-1960, p. 292. 
1 Mankiw. N. Gregory, Jeffrey A Miron and David N. WeiL "The Adjustment of Expectations to a Change in Regime: A Study of the Founding 
of the Federal Reserve," p. 358. 
8 Ibid., p. 358. 
9 The adjusted R' is used in Miron (1996) to illustrate the existence ofa seasonal cycle in various economic time series. 
10 See Miron (1986). 
11 See Barsky, et. al. (1988), Friedman and Schwartz (1963 ), Holland and Toma ( 1991 ). Mankiw and Miron (1986), 
Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987), Miron (1986), Miron ( 1988), and Toma (1993 ). 
5 
destabilizing their respective gold flows. 12 By far, the most popular explanation is that of Miron ( 1988), 
who argues that the Fed began to smooth short-term interest rates shortly after 1913, thus quelling the 
seasonal cycle present in US money markets. 
Alternative hypotheses have also surfaced in the literature. Of these, Clark (l 986) conjectures 
that seasonal strains diminished (worldwide) because of the rise in gold imports from 1915 to 1916; Fishe 
(1991) associates the disappearance of seasonal pressures to heavy US gold inflows (resulting from 
increased exports to allied belligerents) during the inter-war period; and Kool (l 995) concludes that the 
change in interest rate behavior occurred in 1917, not 1913, because of interest rate targeting by the US 
and Britain for the purpose of war finance. 13 
In this paper, we examine the origins of the seasonal cycle in US interest rates, beginning in the 
antebellum period, to explore the notion that a well-defined seasonal cycle is endemic to US money 
markets. Indeed, if seasonal pressures are absent from money markets at other times prior to 1914, 
economic historians may be able to draw from the past in order to better understand the nature of seasonal 
cycles in later periods. 
3. The Seasonal Cycle in Antebellum Money Markets 
This section examines the behavior of antebellum interest rates in Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia and New Orleans for the period 1836 to 1860. 14 All four series, shown in figure 1, represent 
short-term discount rates on commercial paper and bills of exchange. Table 2 presents summary statistics 
and adjusted R2s from regressions of each series (differenced) on monthly seasonal dummies. The New 
York commercial paper rate (used in table 1) is included for the purpose of comparison. 
Table 2 illustrates that antebellum money markets are the highest and most volatile compared to 
either of the post-187 5 series. In particular, Boston, the northernmost money market, and New Orleans, 
"Friedman, M. and A. J. Schwartz, A Monet!\!Y_.History_gJthe United States, 1867-1960, p. 293, Holland, A. Steven and Mark Toma, "The Role 
of the Federal Reserve as 'Lender of Last Resort' and the Seasonal Fluctuation of Interest Rates." p. 659, Barsky, Robert B., N. Gregory Mankiw, 
Jeffrey A. Miron, and David N. Weil, "The Worldwide Change in the Behaviorof Interest Rates and Prices in 1914," p. 1124. 
13 Clark, Truman A., "Interest Rate Seasonals and the Federal Reserve," p.78, Fishe, Raymond P.H., "The Federal Reserve Amendments of 
1917: The Beginning ofa Seasonal Note Issue Policy," p. 311, Kool, Clemens, J.M. "War Finance and Interest Rate Targeting: Regime 
Changes in 1914-1918 .. " p. 365. 
14 The data are from, Bodenhom, Howard, "Capital Mobility and Financial Integration in Antebellum America," pp. 603-608. See data appendix for 
details. 
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the southernmost marketplace and cotton trade 'hub,' report the highest average rates of any series, with 
mean values of 9 .3 % and 9. l %, respectively; the standard deviations for both series exceed 400 basis 
points. 
Once again, the adjusted R2 reported in table 2 indicates the extent to which a seasonal cycle is 
present in each series. The greater the adjusted R 2, the larger the share of interest rate variation that can 
be explained by seasonal fluctuations. It is apparent from this measure that seasonal variations are 
responsible for relatively little of the movement in antebellum interest rates. The seasonal cycle explains 
between 1% and 7% of the total variation in (differenced) antebellum rates, and this explanatory power 
falls to between 1 % and 4% when the northeast markets are considered in isolation. By comparison, 
seasonal pressures account for 19% and 2% of the variation in rates between 1875-1910 and 1920-1933, 
respectively. Hence, antebellum interest rates are similar to their post-Fed counterparts in that they 
exhibit little, if any, seasonal variation. 15 
Table 2: Summary statistics, antebellum and postbellum series, monthly data in first differences. 
Sample Period Mean Standard Adjusted R
2 
Deviation 
New York (a), 1875:01 1910: 12 4.88 1.12 0.19 
New York (b), 1920:01 - 1936:12 3.71 1.97 0.02 
Boston, 1836:02 1859:12 9.28 4.72 0.04 
New York, 1843:08-1859:12 6.82 2.69 0.01 
Philadelphia, 1839:03 1857:06 8.74 3.29 0.04 
New Orleans, 1839:12 1859: 12 9.12 4.04 0.07 
l • Adjusted R 1s based on the following regression spec1ficat1on: 
Llx1 = c + 32(d2) + 33(d3) + ... + 312(d 12) + i>1 
A second test for the presence of a seasonal component consists of calculating the autocorrelation 
functions of the first difference of each data series. A seasonal component is present (and specified as an 
AR( l)) if the correlogram of first differences exhibits positive and significant autocorrelations at 
15 The non-seasonal nature of this series is well-documented in the literature. For example, see Friedman and Schwartz ( 1963) or Mankiw, 
Miron, and Weil (1987). 
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multiples of the seasonal span ( l 2), and zero otherwise. 16 Table 3 presents only those autocorrelations at 
multiples of the seasonal span since all others are in fact zero. Again, only the New York commercial 
paper rate, between 1875-1910, exhibits a significant seasonal cycle, and hence, like the post-Fed period, 
a seasonal component is not identifiable in antebellum money markets. 
Table 3: Test for seasonality: Sample Autocorrelations for the First Difference of the Short Rate, monthly 
data. 
Series Sample Autocorrelations at Annual Lags 
r( 12) r(24) r(36) r(48) r(60) 
New York, 1920:02 - 1936: 12 -.06 -.00 .03 -.07 .02 
New York, 1875:02- 1910:12 .20* .19* .18* .20* .15* 
Boston, 1836:02 - 1859: 12 .05 -.06 .05 .02 .02 
New York, 1843:08 1859: 12 .09 .04 .05 .09 .03 
Philadelphia, 1839:03 1857:06 . 11 .11 .10 -.03 .01 
New Orleans, 1839: 12 - 1859: 12 .08 -.02 .09 .05 .01 
'*' denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
That the seasonal characteristics of the antebellum and post-Fed periods are similar supports the 
notion that a seasonal cycle was not always present in US interest rates prior to the founding of the 
Federal Reserve. However, compared to the post-1914 period, the antebellum economy was more 
agrarian and less industrialized, financial intermediaries were presumably less developed, and monetary 
authorities capable of smoothing away interest rate seasonality were absent. Hence, many of the 
explanations used to describe the absence of seasonal pressures in 1914 will not apply to the antebellum 
markets due to the institutional differences between the two periods. 
4. A Regime Switch in the 19th Century 
Tables 2 and 3 point out that a seasonal cycle in US interest rates is discemable at some time 
after, but not before, the Civil War, questioning the conventional notion that a well-defined seasonal cycle 
is present in short-term interest rates at all times prior to 1914. In this section, we explore the dynamic 
16 Vandaele, Walter, Applied Time Series and Box~Jenkins Models, p. 56. Applications of this method can be found in Clark (1986). The 
correlograms for each data set in levels were inspected for the presence of a seasonal moving average and mixed seasonal models as well; no such 
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nature of seasonality in short-term interest rates between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 
particular, we examine the change in behavior of interest rates around the Civil War and test for the most 
likely date at which this break occurred. To obtain a continuous data set, we restrict our analysis in this 
section to Macaulay's commercial paper rate (1836-1933). 17 
As the degree of seasonality in short-term interest rates changes, so too should the R2 obtained 
from the regression specification employed in tables 1 and 2. In particular, if one were to estimate a 
series of fifteen-year rolling regressions, beginning with 1836.01 and incrementing by one month, the R2 
should rise or fall as the seasonal cycle becomes more or less pronounced, respectively. Figure 2 plots the 
R2 statistics from a set of fifteen-year rolling regressions beginning with the sample 1836.01-1850.12.18 
In general, the intensity of the seasonal cycle varies over time, and it is distinctly absent before 1860 and 
after 1914. Moreover, the explanatory power of the seasonal cycle increases as data from the 1870s are 
included in the rolling regressions. For example, beginning with the sample 1857.11-1872.10, the R2s 
rises from a neighborhood of 10% to that of 17%, meanwhile the highest R2s are produced for data 
regressed over the period 1873 to 1893, suggesting a break in the series occurs in the early 1870s. In 
summary, a well-defined seasonal cycle in US money markets is not the rule throughout the pre-1914 
period. On the contrary, the degree to which the seasonal cycle explains variations in short-term interest 
rates varies, with a relatively distinct change in behavior occurring in the early 1870s. 
To estimate the time at which a break occurred in short-term rates, we use the maximum 
likelihood technique found in Goldfeld and Quandt ( 1973) and employed in Mankiw, et. al. (1987) to 
detect the break in 1914. In particular, the short-term interest rate is modeled as the following: 
(4) 
where o and n denote old and new regimes, respectively; T5 is the first period of the new regime. The 
error terms on the two regression equations, namely nt+I old and new, are assumed to be distributed 
processes could be identified. 
17 These data consist of antebellum Boston from 1836-1859 and the New York commercial Paper rate from 1860-1933. 
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N(O,s0 2) and N(O,sn2) respectively, while (a0 ,b0 , Pns) and (an,bn, Pos) are the regression coefficients 
calculated using OLS; specifically, a, band pare the constant term, autoregressive term and seasonal 
dummy coefficients, respectively. Given these assumptions, the break date can be estimated by 
maximizing the likelihood function conditional on T5 •19 
In this model a break in short-term interest rates implies a change in the parameter values (or 
entire specification) of ( 4). Technically, a shift is possible in both the autoregressive and seasonal 
parameters of the specification. But, given that the autoregressive term included in (4) is both mean 
reverting and significant throughout the full sample used here, we identify a break as a shift in only the 
seasonal parameters. 
The results of the break test indicate that a shift occurred in the series near November, 1873. That 
is, the seasonal specification in (4) underwent a structural change at this time. Hence, it is in the 
neighborhood of this date that the US short rate began to exhibit a statistically significant seasonal 
component. 
5. Explanations for the Absence of Seasonal Pressures in Antebellum Money Markets 
There are three possible explanations for the absence of a seasonal cycle in US interest rates prior 
to 1873: (I) seasonal strains on US credit markets, fueled by agriculture and popularized by Kemmerer 
(1910), did not exist prior to the l 870's; (2) seasonal strains were present, but sterilized by some sort of 
monetary intervention (centrally planned or otherwise); (3) seasonal strains were present, but had no 
discemable effect on money markets due to (unexplained) noise. 
The first explanation is not plausible. The existence of seasonal strains, imparted on US credit 
markets by the agricultural cycle, is well documented in the literature.20 Hence, it is not reasonable to 
18 Similar results are obtained for ten-, twenty- and thirty-year rolling regressions as well. 
19 The break date ean be estimated by maximizing the following likelihood function conditional on T,: 
• ( I \; , ., r. J. I i:-. . I 
l.(r/T )~i ~-) a •c; · • <xp --- '(r -x p )· 
• \2Il ,. " ; 2o-,: ~ ' ' ,, 
This is done by first calculating the maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters in the model and then choosing the T, which has the 
greatest likelihood. While this methodology allows for heteroseedasticity across the two subsamples, it assumes that the innovation variance is 
constant within each subsample. That is, the model specifies constant heteroscedasticity. ln addition, the error term is assumed pure white noise 
and hence autocorrelated errors are not considered. Based on an examination of residuals of the differenced data, these assumptions seem 
appropriate. 
20 See Chandler (1977), Friedman and Schwartz ( 1963 ), Jevons ( 1884), and Kemmerer ( 1910). 
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argue that seasonal pressures simply did not exist prior to the l 870's. The second explanation requires 
that monthly changes in the nation's money supply quelled seasonal pressures on money markets, making 
it impossible for observers to detect a seasonal cycle in antebellum rates. This explanation is 
unconvincing in two respects. First, the smoothing of interest rates over a period of three decades seems 
highly unlikely in the absence of a central monetary authority. Second, if a time series is smoothed, it is 
removed of all transitory fluctuations, and hence it should exhibit non-stationary behavior.21 Judging 
from the autocorrelation functions (acrs) of each series, presented in table 4, all of the antebellum series 
are stationary, as are their postbellum counterparts prior to 1914.22 Hence, antebellum rates do not appear 
to be 'smoothed.'23 The only series that exhibits non-stationary behavior, and hence the only series for 
which the smoothing-hypothesis is plausible, is the New York (b ), a post-Fed series.24 
Table 4: Autocorrelation functions of US short-tenn rates, antebellum and postbellum periods, monthly 
data in levels. 
Sample Period First 12 Sample Autocorrelations 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO 
NewYork(a), 1875:01-1910:12 .86* .65* .46* .32* .23* .19 .15 .I I .09 .08 
New York (b), 1920:01 - 1936:12 .98* .96* .93* .90* .87* .84* .80* .77* .73* .70* 
Boston, 1836:0 I - 1859: 12 
.86* .66* .52* .44* .39* .33* .28* .21 .17 .14 
New York, 1843:07 -1859:12 
.76* .50 .36 .27 .20 .16 .14 .12 .08 .06 
Philadelphia, 1839:02 1857:06 
.81 * .62* .45* .32* .22 .15 .IO .09 .07 .09 
New Orleans, 1839: 11 1859:12 
.66* .58* .44* .31 * .23 .25 .l l .10 .08 .01 
'*'denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
We propose that the third explanation is most appropriate. That is, the absence of a seasonal cycle 
prior to the l 870's is most likely due to money market volatility. Although the annual process of 
planting, harvesting and moving crops occurred at similar times throughout each year, market volatility 
21 Mankiw, N. Gregory, Jeffrey A. Miron and David N. Weil, "The Adjustment of Expectations to a Change in Regime: A Study of the Founding 
of the Federal Reserve," p. 358. 
12 Acrs represent the autoregressive relationship between a time series and its 1st, 2nd, .. ., kth month lag. A series for which acrs begin near 
unity and decline quickly is identified as stationary (and AR( I)), while one for which acrs remain near unity as lag length is increased is 
identified as nonstationarv. 
23 Vandaele, Walter, Applied Time Series and Box-Jenkins Models, p. 56. 
"See Clark (1986), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Mankiw, et. al. {1987), Miron (1988). 
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created large standard deviations from the seasonal path of interest rates, thus hampering the detection 
of a seasonal cycle. After the mid-I 870's, market volatility is quelled sufficiently so that seasonal strains 
affect short-tenn interest rates in a consistent manner year after year. Indeed, the standard error of the 
estimatefrom(4)is2.08between 1836and 1873,butonly.57between 1874and 1910. Hence, the 
variance of innovations to interest rates decreases in the early part of the 1870' s, allowing for the advent 
of a seasonal cycle in US money markets. 
S. Market Volatility and the Absence of a Seasonal Cycle in Antebellum Money Markets 
Despite the absence of a significant seasonal cycle in short-tenn interest rates for both the pre-
1874 and post-1914 periods, there exists one crucial difference between the two series. To illustrate this 
difference, figure 3 (a-t) depicts the seasonal patterns of each series, along with their respective 95% 
confidence bands. As expected, only the postbellum rates, prior to 1910 (figure 3.e.), exhibit significant 
declines in February, May and June, and significant increases in September, October, November, and 
December. Nonetheless, antebellum rates display occasional, albeit insignificant, seasonal movements 
and hence their seasonal patterns are not like those of the post-Fed rates, which display no seasonal 
fluctuations of any kind (figure 3 .f.). In particular, the patterns for antebellum New York and Boston 
(panels a and b, respectively) indicate that many of the same seasonal forces associated with the behavior 
of rates from 1875 to 1910 are also present in antebellum rates. Indeed, some of the monthly movements 
in antebellum Boston and New York can be explained by the planting and harvesting cycles endemic to 
US agriculture. 25 This is consistent with our earlier finding that, while antebellum rates are not seasonal, 
they do not appear smoothed. 
Clearly, the seasonal patterns for antebellum rates, depicted in figures 3 a-d, result from relatively 
infrequent and large seasonal movements in the data; the patterns are not statistically significant because 
the monthly seasonal fluctuations do not occur with sufficient regularity. By comparison, the absence of 
a seasonal pattern after 1914 occurs because seasonal movements are extremely infrequent and small. To 
illustrate this difference between the two periods, we construct a measure tenned the autumn differential, 
12 
defined as the annual October-June interest rate differential. For example, the 1836 autumn differential 
{October 1836 - June 1836 } 
is calculated as June 1836 . Such a metric will hover above zero in years for which the 
underlying series is seasonal, while nonseasonal years will produce a plot that hovers about zero. 
Figure 4 plots the autumn differential for Macaulay's commercial paper rate ( 1836-1936). A 
'violation' of a seasonal cycle for a given year occurs when the autumn differential is either zero or 
negative. Frequent violations occur in both the antebellum and the post-1914 periods, whereby autumn 
rates fall below their summer counterparts in 32% and 45% of the years in these samples, respectively. 
By comparison, between 1874 and 1910, violations occur three times in 37 years (8%). However, despite 
the high number of violations in pre-1874 and post-1914 samples, a seasonal pattern is discernable in the 
latter but not in the former. Put differently, seasonal movements occur infrequently in both of these 
samples, but only in the pre-1874 case does a seasonal pattern emerge. 
One explanation for this difference is that large and occasional seasonal movements, driven by 
financial instabilities in a few of the years between 1836 and 1874 (1839, 1857, and 1873), produce a 
seasonal pattern in interest rates. By comparison, although seasonal movements also occur in the years 
between 1914 and 1933, these movements are relatively small. Large spikes in interest rates during 
autumn panics, common prior to 1874, were nonexistent after 1914 ( 1931 excepted). 
Hence, prior to 187 4, movements in interest rates were erratic and financial instabilities imparted 
relatively large shocks to money markets, particularly in the autumn months. After 1874, the effects of 
financial instabilities on interest rates diminished and the regularization of seasonal movements was 
attained. We attribute this change in behavior of short-term rates in the nineteenth century to the 
following institutional innovation: the introduction of futures markets and the resulting substitution away 
from consignment contracts in the agricultural trade shortly after 1874. 
6. The Financing and Marketing of Grain and Cotton Before the 1870's 
"See Miron (1988), Barsky, et. al. (1988) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 
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6.a. Grain 
Prior to the 1870' s, the US grain trade was financed through a network of producers, local 
merchants, purchasing agents, commission houses, and produce dealers. Producers, including farmers, 
millers and local merchants, were situated in the western-most portion of the network while the produce 
dealers, who purchased grain in its consumption stage, were situated primarily in the East. Purchasing 
agents and commission houses, located in Buffalo, New York and Liverpool, bridged western production 
and eastern consumption with the financial resources necessary to facilitate trade.26 
The eastward movement of grain began with farmers, who offered their production to purchasing 
agents, who in turn sold the grain to commission houses in the East. From there, the grain was sold to 
either a final purchaser or another commission house. Agents and commission houses ameliorated their 
exposure to price risk during crop movements by operating on a consignment basis, rather than 
purchasing the commodities outright. Moreover, each agent requested a commission or fee, hence adding 
costs at each stage of the financing process.27 According to Rothstein ( 1966), this approach linked 
farmers, agents and commission houses such that the "entire procedure was attended by considerable risk 
and speculation, which was assumed by both the consignee and consignor."28 
6.b. Cotton 
While credit systems played a role in Southern agriculture since Colonial times, the network of 
intermediaries differed from that of the grain trade. In particular, factors were the principle lenders of 
funds for the purchase of agricultural inputs, and served as both purchasing agents and intermediaries for 
large Southern planters and Northern and European money lenders.29 The method of credit extension from 
year to year was such that current credit was provided on the basis of future crop production. Liens were 
often placed on future harvests when current production proved insufficient to pay outstanding credit 
26 Rothstein, M., "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1850-1873," p. 65. 
27 Ibid., pJ 20. 
28 Ibid., p.120. 
29 Small fanns in the hills of the Carolinas, Georgia and Tennessee were self-sufficient. They bought and sold little and thus had no need for a 
system of credit. 
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balances. 30 
However, after the Civil War, factors frequently lacked the funds to make advances to farmers 
and hence were forced to seek advances from commission houses in the North and in Europe.31 A system 
similar to that in the West evolved such that large commission houses dealt with correspondents in 
Liverpool, and factors became the local agents (receivers) within the hinterland.32 
7. Changes in the Financing and Marketing of Grain and Cotton in the 1870's 
Storage and shipment technologies such as grain elevators and railroads became available in the 
l 850's. Because these implements required that staples be stored and transported in bulk, shipments 
could no longer be tagged according to farmer or region. Moreover, due to the high volume of transports, 
purchasers were unable to inspect and choose their bundles upon delivery. This presented a problem in 
the East because produce agents often gauged the quality (and hence price) of a staple on the basis of such 
information and inspections.33 Hence, a nationally accepted system of grading and standardizing staples 
was required. 
In the 1850's, grain exchanges emerged, and their roles included weighing, inspecting and 
classifying each commodity shipment.34 The Chicago Board of Trade began this practice in the late 
l 850's. St. Louis and Buffalo exchanges adopted similar methods in 1854. Like the grain industry, 
cotton exchanges defined, standardized and inspected cotton. The first US cotton exchange formed in 
New York one year after the Liverpool Cotton Brokers Association in 1869, while a 'complete' network 
of grading and standardizing was not in place until 1874.35 The East, and the New York Produce 
Exchange in particular, accepted the methods of grading used in the West and South as a national 
"' By 1855, the risks of factoring appeared so excessive that the Southern Commercial Convention recommended that the chamhers of commerce 
and commission merchants to the southern and southwestern cities, "adopt such a system oflaws and regulations as will put a stop to the 
dangerous practice heretofore existing of making advances to planters in anticipation of their crops a practice entirely at variance with 
everything like safety in business transactions and tending directly to establish the relations of master and slave between the merchant and planter 
by bringing the latter into the most abject and servile bondage." Cf. Hammond (l 897), p. 110. 
3
' Rothstein, M., "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1850-1873," p.111. 
32 Ibid., p. 65. 
B Ibid., p. 121. 
14 Chandler, A.D .. The Visible Hand, p. 211. 
35 Ibid., p. 213. 
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standard at this time.36 This complete network made business communication easier and less subject to 
expensive arbitration.37 
In addition, a national system of grading standards allowed for the use of 'to arrive' or futures 
contracts. A futures contract stipulated the quality, amount, price and (a future) delivery date of a staple; 
the staple was purchased in cash upon delivery. High volume futures contracting required the 
standardization of staples because contracts were made before the deliverable was harvested. Hence, both 
parties to the contract had to agree on the quality of the deliverable before it was exchanged. It was not 
until the 1870's that the language used to define such 'quality' was generally accepted by all parties 
involved, including the conservative business community in the East.38 
Futures trading also required a technological infrastructure capable of communicating prices 
across markets, nationally and internationally, in a timely fashion.39 Telegraphic communication 
provided this service.40 Perfected in 1837, the telegraph impacted the commodity exchanges some thirty 
to forty years later by allowing prices in the East to be communicated to the South and West so that grain 
and cotton could be purchased while the goods were still in transit.41 In fact, the staples could be 
purchased before they were harvested. Slow and unreliable communication streams before 1874 
motivated agents to engage in (riskier) consignment contracts. Agents and commission houses in the East 
refused to take ownership of the commodities at a fixed price because of the information lags coming 
from the West. In summary, some form of futures trading existed prior to the Civil War, however, 
innovations in staple standardization, transportation and communications developed such that futures 
trading became fully operational in 1874.42 
8. The Effect of Futures Markets on US Money Market Volatility 
36 Chandler, AD., The Visible Hand, p. 211. 
37 Rothstein, M., "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1850-1873," p. 67. 
38 Chandler, AD., The Visible Hand, p. 214. 
39 Nonetheless, futures trading took place before such technological infrastructures became available. Rothstein ( 1965) explains that regular mail 
service by "fast boats" enabled British grain importers in the I 840's to send ahead samples of a staple which was still in transit. Merchants on the 
floor of London's Baltic Exchange entered into buy and sell contracts on the "to arrive"' staple based on inspection of these samples. 
'
0 Rothstein, M., "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1850-1873," p. 67. 
41 Chandler, A.O., The Visible Hand, p. 214. 
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The effect of futures markets in the post-1874 US agricultural trade centered on a risk-
transferring scheme referred to as hedging. Chandler writes that traders used this technique 
"immediately" following the introduction of the modern (post 1874) futures contract.43 In general, 
hedging transfers price risk, or the volatility of an asset's price, from hedgers to speculators. In terms of 
the l 870's, hedgers were able to immunize their portfolios from the volatility of staple prices. In general, 
futures contracts allowed grain traders to move crops with relatively less risk.44 The reason for this was 
twofold. 
First, futures contracts insulated traders from the annual fluctuations in staple prices, caused by 
such real factors as variations in planting and harvesting conditions. As a result, when traders borrowed 
from the money market to purchase these staples, the amount of cash that they required (demanded) was 
also relatively insulated from staple price volatility. Hence, while real shocks continued to hit agricultural 
markets after 1874, the demand and supply for loanable funds remained relatively unaffected. Therefore, 
money markets were less inclined to react to real shocks and hence the volatility in the annual cost of 
borrowing decreased. As a result, interest rate volatility diminished such that statistically significant 
seasonality, in addition to seasonal patterns, was discernible after 1874. 
In effect, futures contracts, used in conjunction with hedging techniques, contributed to a 
decrease in interest rate volatility because they insulated traders from price risk, as uncertainties regarding 
the amount required to purchase a bundle of staples were mitigated. This led to borrowing patterns that 
were less erratic from year to year. For example, suppose a purchasing agent planned to borrow money to 
pay for a staple shipment coming in from the West. The quantity of money demanded by this agent 
equaled the product of the price of the staple times the quantity purchased. By engaging in a futures 
contract, the agent effectively insulated himself from any variations in the market price of the deliverable 
that might occur between the time the order was placed and the staple was shipped. Since the agent 
'locked in' at a specific purchase price, the amount of money he needed to borrow was also insulated 
42 Rothstein, M., "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1850-1873," p. 72. 
"Chandler, AD., The Visible Hand, p. 212. 
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from price fluctuations. Therefore, money markets, and interest rates in particular, were Jess volatile in 
the advent of futures contracts. 
However, the futures contract did not eradicate seasonal patterns in interest rates. Borrowing 
increased during the harvest and crop moving seasons regardless of whether or not a futures contract was 
employed. For example, in the presence of futures contracts: wheat was purchased in September, wheat 
prices fluctuated in September, transactions were still settled in cash, and if the long position required a 
loan to purchase wheat, that loan was acquired in September. The only difference was that traders were 
certain about the price they would effectively pay in the market for the staple. In the context of this 
example, the demand for money increased every September just as it did prior to the existence of futures 
markets. Likewise, if the September harvest was poor, staple prices rose accordingly. Hence, the annual 
movements in the marketing of wheat remained seasonal and the volatility of staple prices did not 
necessarily diminish. Nonetheless, the transfer of price risk from traders to speculators quelled money 
market volatility. This led to a decrease in the variance of interest rates and hence statistically significant 
seasonality was introduced into US money markets. This notion is consistent with our findings that 
seasonal patterns in interest rates were present before and after 1874 while the variance of interest rates 
and money market shocks in general declined shortly after this date. We suggest that these changes led to 
the introduction of a statistically significant seasonal cycle shortly after 1874. 
Note, while the speculator took the opposite (risky) position, to that of the trader, the former was 
presumably better diversified in the presence of futures contracts than the latter would have been in the 
absence of futures contracts. Hence, a speculator's losses on a particular futures contract did not shock 
the demand for money in the manner that the trader's loss would have done prior to futures contracts. 
A second explanation for the decrease in money market volatility with the advent of futures 
trading is the substitution of futures for consignment contracts around 1874.45 Regarding the 
abandonment of consignment contracts, Chandler writes, "No longer did the financing of the movement 
44 Clark, lG., The Grain Trade in the Old Northwest, p. 120. 
•
5 Chandler, A.O., The Visible Hand, p. 211. 
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of the crops require long and often risky negotiations between one commission merchant and 
another.''46 Once futures markets were fully operational, the crowding out of the consignment contract 
was immediate.47 
Negotiations based on consignment were inherently risky because none of the parties involved 
purchased the produce from the farmers, millers and merchants at the point of production. Rather, the 
owners of the produce were compensated upon the execution of a final sale in the East. Prior to this sale, 
traders at every level of the marketing process were unaware of the price that they would pay or receive 
for the produce. Regardless of the motive, contracts made on consignment and financed with short-tenn 
credit tied money markets to the volatility of staple prices. This occurred because a sudden change in 
price would unexpectedly affect the financial positions of borrowers and lenders. This would lead to 
relatively large fluctuations in interest rates. 
The design of a futures contract was obviously quite opposite that of a consignment contract. By 
generally adopting the fonner in 1874, players in the agricultural trade could choose between business 
transactions of varying risk. For the conservative business-person wishing to purchase staples from the 
West, a futures contract and a hedging scheme was the ideal combination for guarding oneself against 
price risk. Likewise, for the speculator, schemes such as selling staples short in anticipation of a price 
decrease or taking a long position in anticipation of a price increase enabled quick gains (and losses) to be 
made. 
The emergence of futures markets, in conjunction with hedging techniques and the eradication of 
consignment contracts, could explain the decrease in interest rate volatility observed after 1874 and the 
subsequent emergence of statistically significant seasonality. In addition, this explanation is consistent 
with the observed seasonal patterns in US short-tenn interest rates throughout the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. 
46 Chandler, AD., The Visible J-Iand, p. 212. 
"See Chandler (1977), Clark (1966), and Hammond (1897). 
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9. Conclusion 
The notion that seasonal cycles are relevant to the study of business cycles is regaining popularity 
among economists. Nonetheless, if seasonal cycles are to assist economists in their understanding of 
business cycles, seasonal cycles must be explored more closely. Indeed, the change in behavior of 
seasonal cycles in US money markets, around 1914, is one case that continues to puzzle economists. 
This paper examined the origins of the seasonal cycle in US interest rates, beginning in the 
antebellum period. Tests indicated that variations in short-term interest rates are relatively unexplained 
by the seasonal cycle prior to the mid- I 870s, and hence, are similar to their post-1914 counterparts. 
However, despite the absence of a significant seasonal cycle in short-term interest rates for both the pre-
1874 and post-1914 periods, the two series differ in one crucial respect. Namely, antebellum rates display 
occasional, albeit insignificant, seasonal movements and hence their seasonal patterns are not like those of 
the post-Fed rates, which display no seasonal fluctuations of any kind. 
A break test, performed on the commercial paper rate between 1836 and 1910, indicated that a 
shift occurs in the series in the final months of 1873 and hence the US short rate began to exhibit a 
statistically significant seasonal cycle at this time. 
The change in the behavior of interest rates can be explained by the introduction of futures 
markets and the resulting substitution away from consignment contracts in the agricultural trade. By 
hedging in the futures markets, staple traders were able to protect themselves from erratic price 
movements. Price risk declined and money market volatility subsequently decreased, allowing for the 
introduction of a seasonal cycle to short-term interest rates. 
In conclusion, the notion that seasonal cycles are a well-defined and predictable phenomenon in 
macroeconomic time series appears inappropriate in the context of US money markets. On the contrary, 
seasonal cycles can exhibit irregularities, as exemplified by their absence in US money markets prior to 
1874 and after 1914, and hence should not be dismissed as uninteresting fluctuations. Moreover, that a 
financial innovation (futures contracts) contributed to the regularization of seasonal cycles in 1874 is 
instructive to the extent that similar innovations may have comparable effects on business cycles. 
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Figure I: Short-term Antebellum Interest Rates, l 836-1860 
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Figure 3.b. Seasonal Patterns and Standard Errors, New York, 1843-1859 
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